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The welfare  gains  from  reducing  risk  through  agricultural  price
stabilization  are  unlikely  to be large  relative  to the  welfare  gains
from price reform  that reduces market distortions  for the six
agricultural  commodities  considered  in this study.
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In recent  years, agricultural  price  stabilization  * For rice, free  trade hurts producers  because
policies  have been  recommended  in Brazil  as a  it destabilizes  income and reduces  its mean. But
way to reduce  govenmment  intervention  and open  the efficiency  cost of current  policies  (which
the sector  for intemational  trade without  intemal-  protect  producers)  is large. The band rule
izing  the instability  of world  prices.  reduces  the cost of risk to producers  significantly
and its efficiency  c.,sts are relatively  small.
The proposal  discussed  (and  eventually
implemented  in 1987)  was to establish  a system  * For wheat,  the current  situation  is riskier
of price  bands around  a moving  average  of past  than free  trade and large deficits  are incurred  to
prices,  with  the government  relying  on stocks  to  support  producer  prices  and to subsidize  con-
defend  the bands.  sumers. The inefficiencies  caused  by the band
rule are larger  than the  value attributable  to
Braverman  and his associates  evaluated  the  reducing  risks.
"band proposal"  for six commodities,  using
historical  data and posing  this question: what  * For cotton,  free trade will  increase  risk. No
would  have  happened  if price bands  had been  calculations  of the inefficiencies  of current
adopted  in the  past six to ten years (compared  policies  were made  but other studies  indicate  that
with free  trade)? There  were two major  findings.  they are great.
First, the  implications  of adopting  a band-  * For soybeans,  the band rule  has virtually  no
rule  policy  depend  heavily  on the specific  effect  on price instability,  producer  revenue,  and
characteristics  of the commodities.  The results  producer  surplus. The same  conclusion  on
suggest  that:  instability  is seen for soy oil and soy  meal.
* For edible beans,  the band  policy  benefits  Second,  the welfare  gains for risk reduction
producers. Risks associated  with this crop are  through  agricultural  price stabilization  are
great  and the efficiency  cost of interventions  is  unlikely  to be large relative  to the welfare  gains
smaUer  than the benefits  to farners in reduced  from  price reform  that reduces  market  distortions
risk. The  band rule wil not stabilize  producers'  for these six agricultural  commodities.
income,  however,  and wiUl  require  an unreason-
ably  high level of stocks.  More  research  is needed  into the  macroeco-
nomic  implications  of price stabilization  policies,
* For  corn, the risk benefits  are low. The best  particularly  in countries  with unstable  but
altemative  for the govemment  may be free trade.  moderate  rates  of inflation,  countries  in which
agricultural  expenditures  represent  a large
proportion  of the budget.
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1.  Introduction
Agricultural  Price  Stabilization  came  to  the  forefront  of  the  policy  debate
in Brazil in recent  years.  To a large  extent stabilization  policies  were
advocated  as an instrument  to reduce  government  intervention,  opening  up the
sector  for  international  trade,  without  internalizing  the  instability  of world
prices.
The first reform  proposals  (see  Dias and Lopes (1983),  Lopes and  Dias
(1984),  Dias and Mendon,a  (1983)  and  Lopes (1987))  to incorporate  these  two
objectives  consist  of  a  system  of  price  bands  around  a three  year  moving  average
of international  prices  (FOB  for  exportables  and  CIF for importables)  for  all
agricultural  commodities.  If  prices  remained  within  the  upper  and  lower  limits
established,  'free  trade'  would  take  place.  Otherwise  the  government  intervenes
through  tariffs  and  subsidies.
This  proposal,  was first  implemented  in 1987.  The  main aspects  of the
policy  were:  a) the  reference  price  was  a five  year  moving  average  of  wholesale
prices  in S§o  Paulo (and  not international  prices),  b) to defend  the  band  the
government  would  rely  on stocks  and  c)  the  bands  were  established  for  only  three
commodities:  edible  beans,  rice  and  corn (complete  'free  trade'  was  adopted  for
soybeans  and  cotton).
In this paper  we present  a methodology  to evaluate  the  band proposal'
(which  can  be applied  to other  countries  or other  commodities)  and  results  for
edible  beans,  rice,  cotton,  corn,  soybeans  and  wheat  (even  though  there  has  never
been a specific  proposal  for  wheat,  it  was included). The  approach  relies  on
historical  data and  poses  the following  question:  what  would  have  happened  if-2-
price  bands  have been  adopted  in the  past (say  the last  six  to ten  years)?  To
answer and maintain consistency  with policy makers' objective of  trade
liberalization,  we  have  first  considered the  implications (for  price
stabilization)  of free  trade  in all  six  commodities.
Newibery  and Stiglitz  (1981)  is a major  contribution  to this  area  and is
the basis for our study.  The  methodology,  however,  is subject  to important
limitations.  First, it  only  considers microeconomic  aspects of  price
stabilization. It may well be that policy  makers'  concerns  derive  from the
macroeconomic  implications  of price instability. With nominal  wages sticky
downwards,  unexpected  price  increases  may  lead  to  demands  for  higher  wages,  but
in the symmetric  case of unexpected  price declines,  nominal  wages are not
reduced. This,  in turn,  leads  to an increase  in  average  real  wages  and,  very
likely,  to  higher  inflation. These  negative  supply  shocks  can  be  mitigated  by
price stabilization. The net effect,  though,  can not be determined  without
detailed  quantitative  analysis  since  the  band  policy  has  a  budgetary  cost  which
may exert  further  pressure  on inflation.
A second  limitation  has  to  do  with  credit  rationing,  bankruptcy  and  impacts
on productivity. It may be, for example,  that farmers  facing  severe  credit
constraint  (as  is  the  case  for  many small  producers  and  tenants)  will  be forced
to  reduce,  for  some  time,  the  use  of  modern  inputs  and/or  consumption  following
a year of low prices  and low income,  with negative  implications  for factor
productivity  and  well being. For farmers  living  close  to the  poverty  line,  a
year  of bad  prices  and low  income  may lead  to starvation.
ln spite  of the  limitations,  the  focus  on  a microeconomic  representative
agent  model raises  many important  issues.  In an economy  in which few risk
markets for agricultural  commodities  exist,  as is the case in Brazil,  price-3-
stabilization  may be an important  form of insurance  to the average  producer.
Benefits  are  measured  by the  value  farms  attach  to that  insurancel.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows:  in  section  2  we present  a  brief  summary
of the  methodology  adopted  for the study;  in section  3 the main results  for
edible  beans,  corn,  rice,  cotton  and  wheat  are  presented. Section  4 contains
the  results  for  soybeans  separately  because  the  model  is,  in  fact,  a simplified
multi-market.  The  last  section  has  some  concluding  comments  and  suggestions  for
future  research.
2.  Methodology
To estimate  the  value of price  stabilization  Newbery  and Stiglitz,  op.
cit.,  relied  on the  fact  that  risk  has  a cost  for  both  producers  and  consumers.
If we let  yo and  Yi be income  (both  random  variables)  before  and  after  prices
stabilization  respectively,  the  value  of  stabilization  for  a  producer  is  B,  given
by:
EU(yo)  =  EU(y1 -B)
where  U is  the  utility  function  and  E  is  the  expectation  operator.  This  equation
can,  in  principle,  be  solved  numerically  to  yield  the  value  of  B. Taking  Taylor
series  approximations  Newbery  and  Stiglitz  (1981)  (see  also  Kanbur  (1984))  show
that:
1 Braverman  et al (1990]  considers  also multi-market  effects  of price
stabilization.  Braverman,  Hammer  and  associates  made  use  of  multi-market  models
in  deterministic  settings  to  study  the  im?acts  of  price  policies.  Their  results
indicate  that  interactions  among  markets  is  significant  and  that,  in  many  cases,
ignoring  this  effects  may  even lead  co  wrong  qualitative  results.  However,  for
the  study  of  price  stabilization  the  results  were  far  less  interesting.  In  view
of this  they  are  not reported  here.-4-
B  ,  _  O5.XRxaG2 (1)
Eyo  0
where A indicates the difference  between the values on the pos and pre
stabilization  scenarios,  Eyo  and  Ey,  are  mean  incomes  in the  two  scenarios,  ai
(iU 0,1) are  the  coefficients  of variation of  income before and after
stabilization  has  taken  place  and  R  is  the  coefficient  of  relative  risk-aversion
of  Arrow-Pratt.
Equation  (1)  has  two  components:  the  first  term  (called  transfer  benefit,
BT)  indicates  the  gain  or  loss  to  producers  due  to  the  change  in  average  income.
This  gain  or loss  will occur  irrespective  of the  agent's  behavior  with respect
to risk. The second  term  is  the  efficiency  gain  (Be)  and  it  is the 'pure  gain'
due to stabilization. It depends,  rather  intuitively,  on the extent  of risk
reduction  (Ar 2)  and on the magnitude  of the coefficient  of relative  risk
aversion. For  an agent  which is risk-neutral  (R  =  0) this  term  will be zero.
The  higher  the  degree  of relative  risc  aversion,  the  higher  the  weight  of  Be in
the  determination  of the  final  value  of the  benefit.
In general  there  is  no guarantee  that  price  stabilization  will stabilize
income  (see  Newbery  and  Stiglitz,  op.  cit.). The  transfer  benefit  may also
be  negative. This  will  be the  case,  for  example,  if  supply  is  the  unique  source
of instability,  the  stabilized  price  is set  so  that  demand  will take  up average
supply  and demand  elasticity  is less  than  one,  as it is for  many agricultural
commodities  (Kanbur,  op.  cit.).
To  measure  the  benefit  to  consumers  Newbery  and  Stiglitz  rely  ont  the  same
principle  (i.e.,  the  cost  of risk). They  show  that  for  consumers  the  benefit
of price  stabilization,  BC,  can  be approximated  by:-5-
Bc  (t1J2)(1  - O)a 2  +  {(1I2)Ea  2 - RCp(p,I)o 1 ap  (1') x  p 
where  X is average  consumer  expenditure.  e  is  the  elasticity  of demand,  op and
aI are coefficier.ts  of variation  of p-ice  and  consumer  income,  p(I,p)  is the
coefficient  of  correlation  between price and consumer income, kc  is the
consumer's  relative  risk  aversion  to income  variability,  given  prices.
The  first  term  on the  right  side  of (1')  is simply  the  consumer  transfer
benefit. The  first  term  in  the  curly  bracket,  is  referred  to  as the  'arbitrage
benefit',  which could  accrue  even if consumers  were income  risk  neutral.  In
fact,  these are the pure social  gains that  we might expect  private  storage
activity  to capture. The  assumption  behind  intervention  must be that  because
of market imperfections  these gains remain  unexploited.  The last term in
expression  (1')  is the  risk  benefit.
It  was  not  possible  to  use  Newbery  and  Stiglitz  method  directly  in  the  case
of Brazil.  Fir!;t  because the wedge between producer  and consumer  prices
introduced  by government  interventions  does  not allow  the application  of the
above formulae:  which price should  be used to calculate  the coefficient  of
variation?  Second,  the  band  proposal  is  really  one  of  allowing  e  trade  within
certain  limits,  and  whether  or not the  limits  are  hit depend  on the  potential
free trade  outcome.  In order  to evaluate  the policy,  therefore,  wJ  have to
charactorize  the free  trade  outcomes. Third,  the  appropriate  domestic  market
specification  that  corresponds  to  the  Newbery  and  Stiglitz  international  market
analysis  is  that  of  a  non-traded  good. For  traded  goods  in  a small  open  economy
the  approach  and  the  formulae  have to  be  modified.- 6 -
The  principal  aspects  of the  model  to evaluate  the  costs  and  benefits  of
price  stabilization  in  Brazil  are  the  following  (for  more  details,  see  Braverman
et.  al.,  1990):
i) linear  supply  and  demand  equations;
ii)  the  slopes  of  demand  and  supply  are  assumed  constant  over  time.
They  were estimated  from  average  prices  and  quantities  for  each  commodity  and
the  respective  elasticities 2;
iii)  uncertainty  only  affects  the  intercepts  of demand  and supply.
Intercepts  were estimated  from  the  historical  data  and  the (constant)  slopes.
The  analysis  is  in  three  steps:  first  we look  at  the  historical  situation
and  characterize  variability  of the  relevant  series  (producer  prices,  producer
revenues,  producer  income 3, production,  consumer  prices,  consumption  and  consumer
surplus);  then we assume that all interventions  are removed  and show the
consequences  oi this  free  trade  policy  and,  finally,  we study  the  implications
of the 'band  proposal'  for  the  sante  set  of variables.
Because  of transportation  costs  and middle-men  margins  all prices  are
referred  to Sao  Paulo. A description  of the  procedures  utilized  to  make these
conversions  as  well as a complete  account  of all  the  data  base  can  be found  in
Braverman  et. al.(1990).  The  relevant  demand  and  supply  elasticities  are  listed
in the  Appendix.
2 If a  is, say, the price elasticity  of supply  the slope is liven  by
a.(Eq/Ep),  where Eq and Ep are average  quantity  produced  and average  price
received  by the  farmer  respectively.
3 Producer  income  is  assumed  to be equal  to producer  surplus.-7-
3.  Selected  Results:  Single  Market  Analysis
The  products  considered  in  the  analysis  we-e  divided  into  two  categories:
traded  and  non-traded.  Cotton  and  wheat  are  traded,  rice,  corn  and  edible  bians
are  non traded. This  classification  should  be taken  with care.  For  both rice
and corn there exists  an active  international  market and Brazil  engages  in
trading  in these markets (as  an importer  of rice,  and as both exporter  and
importer  of corn 4).  However,  this  was a consequence  of policy  decisions  to
control  and/or  stabilize  prices  and  does  not  necessarily  reflect  trade  advantages
or  disadvantages.  For  edible  beans  the  non-traded  good  assumption  is  the  natural
one  to  make:  the  international  market  is  restrict  and  Brazil  very  seldom  imports
according  to its  needs.
3.1  Edible Beans
This  a  critical  crop  from  the  point  of  view  of policy. It  is  an  important
food  staple  and  production  is  growing  a8  a small  pace  in  recent  years.  Moreover,
in  contrast  with recent  trends  in  other  food  crops  (rice  and  wheat,  for  example)
yields  are  stagnant  or decreasing.
4  During  the  1980s,  Brazil  was  a  net importer  of corn.  However,  during  the
period  covered  by our data, there  were years in  which the country  was a net
exporter.- a  -
Table  1  presents  a summary  of the  analysis  for  edible  beans.5  The  first
column  of the  table  displays  average  values  for the  period  1971/1986  for  key
economic  variables. The  average  real  price  received  by farmers  was  CzS 10.306
per  kg and  the  price  paid  by consumers  was Cz$ 10.50  per  kg.  The coefficient
of  variation  of  consumer  price  is  higher  than  that  for  producer  price,  possibly
reflecting  the  instability  of  the  policy  during  the  perio4. In  order  to  sustain
the  price  differential  the  government  has  maintained  average  stocks  of  the  order
of 25 thousand  metric  tons.
Instability  of  supply  and  demand  and  of  government  policies  are  responsible
for  the  variability  of  prices,  revenues  and  incomes.  Risk  averse  preducers  will
pay  to  have that instability  reduced. To  measure  this,  the  risk  premilim  (that
is, the cruzado  value of the insurance  producers  would pay to get rid of
instability)  is  2.84  percent  of the  average  value  of  producers  revenue  and  1.80
percent  of  producers  income. These  calculations,  based  on the  assumption  that
the  coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  is equal  to  one 7, are  shown  in  Table
2,  which  also  displays  the  risk  premium  for  other  values  of the  coefficient  of
relative  risk  aversion.
5  Sensitivity  analysis  was  performed  with  respect  to  key  parameters  adopted
in  the  analysis  of  all  six  crops  included  in  the  study  (like  elasticities,  width
of  the  band rule,  etc.).  The results  are  not reported  here (see  Braverman  et.
al.),  but the  qualitative  nature  of the  conclusions  did  not  change  in response
to these  tests.
6  All cruzado  values  in the  paper  refer  to  .6. Currency  units  were  not
changed  back to  cruzeiros.
7 No attempt  to estimate  the  coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  was
made. The value of one  was estimated  by Binswanger  ;1980)  from a sample  of
agricultural  producers in India. In view of the crucial role that this
coefficient  plays,  all  tables  containing  risk  analysis  will display  results  for
various  values  of R.- 9  -
Table  1
BEANS  SINGLE  MARKET  SUMMARY  (1971-1986,  Detrended)
Series  /  Units  s  Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Bar.d  Rule
Producer  Revenue  :  Mean  20615.58  21416.64  16182.06
Million  Cz$  :  C.V.  0.2  0.38  0.22
Producer  Surplus  : Mean  16115.48  16573.04  13264.53
Million  Cz$  :  C.V.  0.19  0.33  0.26
Consumer  Surplus  :  Mean  20158.58  21071.87  25502.51
Million  Cz$  :  C.V.  0.28  0.34  0.36
Producer  Price  :  Mean  10027.87  10173.56  8292.30
CzS/ton  :  C.V.  0.30  0.35  0.12
Consumer  Price  s  Mean  10503.59  10173.56  8292.30
Cz$/ton  :  C.V.  0.37  0.35  0.12
Production  :  Mean  2119.84  2131.95  1975.66
1000  Tons  : C.V.  0.16  0.17  0.24
Consumption  t  Mean  2095.27  2131.95  2341.01
1000  Tons  I  C.V.  0.14  0.17  0.18- 10  -
Table  2
BEANS  PRODUCE SURPLUS  (Million  Cz$,  Detrended)
Risk  Coefficient  s  Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Band  Rule
1.00
Risk  Premium  289.38  832.03  532.98
2  of series  mean s  1.802  5.02Z  4.02Z
1.33
Risk  Premium  388.80  1103.81  728.26
Z  of series  mean :  2.41Z  6.66X  5.492
1.67
Fisk Premium  s  489.74  1376.05  931.23
2 of series  mean :  3.04Z  8.302  7.02X
2.00
Risk  Premium  s  592.20  1650.38  1140.66
2 of series  mean  3.67Z  9.962  8.60X- 11  -
The 'free  trade'  (or  competitive  equilibrium)  solution  of the  model is
displayed  in the  second  column  of Table  1 (and  the  corresponding  risk  analysis
is in the second  column  of Table 2).  Notice that producer  price is more
unstable,  but consumer  price  is not (in  other  words,  government  interventions
destabilized  consumer  price  over  the  period  of analysis). Similarly,  producer
revenue  and  producer  income  (as  estimated  by  the  producer  surplus)  display  higher
coefficients  of variation.  As  indicated  in Table 2 the risk premium is
substantially  higher:  6.70  percent  of  average  revenue  and  5.02  percent  of  average
income,  respectively.  A comparison  of  values  of  the  income  streams  (expression
1) indicates  that  stabilization  of  producer  has  a  value  of  3.64  percent  of free
trade  income;  this is  partly  compensated  by a negative  transfer  equivalent  to
2.75 percent  of free  trade  income  (i.e.,  income  is 2.75  percent  lower  in the
actual  situation  than  in  the  competitive  solution).  From  the  producers'  point
of  view,  actual  policies  were favorable  compared  to  the  free  trade  outcome,  even
though  the  gain is  small  in  quantitative  terms.
The  efficiency  costs  of  current  policies  can  be roughly  estimated  by the
change in average  producer and consumer surpluses  plus the change in the
government  deficit (which  is zero under free trade)  calculated  from average
prices  and  quantities.  The  change  in  surpluses  (free  trade  values  minus  current
situation  values)  is approximately  1,370  millions  Cz$; the  government  runs  an
estimated  surplus  from  beans  operations  of 950  millions  Cz$.8  The  deadweight
loss  due  to  government  intervention  is 420  million  Cz$.  The  monetary  value  of
8  The  estimated  impact  of  the  policies  on  the  budget  is  given  by:  (pc  - pP)C
+  (pf  - pP)(Y - C) - pP(Y - C)r, where: pc and pP are, respectively, producer
and  consumer  price;  C  is  the  level  of  consumption,  Y is  the  level  of  production,
pf is  the  free  trade  price  and  r (=15  percent  per  year)  is the  storage  cost  of
the  government.  Observe  that  government  stocks  are  valued  at  the  free  trade  price
since  they  are  relatively  small  compared  to  production  and  consumption.- 12 -
reduced  risk  to producers,  for  a coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  of one,
is (832  - 289 =)  543  million  Cz$  which is even larger  than  the inefficiency
losses  associated  with current  interventions.
The  value  of price  stabilization  for  edible  beans  is  high  compared  with
some of the other crops included  in the study.  This does not come as a
surprise.  The  coefficient  of  variation  of  production  is  one  of  the  highest  among
the crops included  in the study and so is the coefficient  of variation  of
producer  prices. In  addition,  risk  markets  do  not  exist  to allow  producers  to
defend  themselves  against  the  bad  states  of  nature 9.
The 'band  proposal'  considered  in  the  analysis  resembles  the  policy  first
adopted  in 1987. The  reference  price  is a 60  month  moving  average  of the  past
prices. The  upper  and  lower  limits  are  17  percent  above  and  below  the  reference
price  (in  actual  fact,  the  lower  limit  was the  minimum  price).
Producer  and  consumer  prices  under  this  policy  will be more stable  than
both  free  trade  and  the  historically  observed  prices. Average  prices  are  lower
than  in  the  other  two  scenarios.  In spite  of the  stabilization  of prices,  this
policy  will  not stabilize  producer  surplus  compared  with the  actual  situation,
but  it  will  when  compared  to  the  free  trade  outcome.  However,  for  producers  the
additional  stabilization  will  not  be  enough  to  compensate  for  the  decline  in  the
average  prices.
One  additional  difficulty  with  the  band  proposal  for  edible  beans  is  that,
on average,  consumption  will  be  higher  than  production.  The  government  will  be
required  to sell,  on average,  every  year,  360  thousands  metric  tons of beans
9 Formal  risk  markets  do not exist  for  most agricultural  commodities  in
Brazil.  In the case of edible  beans  this is even  worst because  informal  risk
sharing  arrangements,  like,  for  example,  advance  purchases  made  by  industry  with
guaranteed  prices,  are  not  common.- 13 -
(this  occurs  because  the  upper limit  of the  band is hit more often  the lower
limit). Compared  to  historical  stock  levels  and  with imports  over  the  period,
this is  extremely  high.  It is  very  unlikely  that  the  government  will be able
to sustain  the  policy  over  an extended  period  of time.
3.2  Corn
Production  of corn in  Brazil  is  widespread. Most  of the  states  produce
it,  even though  with very different  technologies.  Only a small  proportion  of
production  is  directly  utilized  for  human  consumption;  the  bulk  of  consumption
is  animal  feed.  Table  3  shows  average  values  of  the  relevant  variables  for  corn
for  the  period  1977-1986.  Price  instability  is  not  as  large  as  for  edible  beans.
Consumer  price  shows  more  instability  than  producer  price  and  this  is  reflected
in the larger  coefficient  of variation  of consumer  surplus  in relation  to
producer  surplus.
The simulation  of free  trade  is  presented  in  the second  column  of Table
3.  Producer  price  is  now  more  volatile;  consumer  price  is also  more  volatile
but  the  increased  variability  is  far  less  than  observed  for  producer  price. Both
producer  revenue  and  income  are  more  unstable  under  free  trade.
Table 4 presents  the risk analysis.  For producer's  income  the risk
premium  is 1.59  percent  of mean income. A comparison  of revenue  and income
streams  under  free  trade  and  the  actual  situation indicates  a  welfare  value  of
stabilization  of only  0.36  percent  of average  income  under  free  trade. Since
the  free  trade  average  value  of  producer  income  is  higher  than  the  observed,  the
net result  of the  policy  is a  welfare  loss  equivalent  to 1.52  percent  of free
trade  income.- 14 -
Table  3
CORN SINGLE  MARKET  SUMMARY  (1977-1986,  Detrended)
Series  /  Units  :  Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Band  Rule
Producer  Revenue  :  Mean  33931.09  35103.37  35198.21
Million  Cz$  :  C.V.  0.15  0.18  0.13
Producer  Surplus  :  Mean  28128.02  29003.02  29139.99
Million  Cz$  :  C.V.  0.17  0.19  0.16
Consumer  Surplus  s  Mean  37509.06  31632.03  31572.71
Million  Cz$  :  C.V.  0.24  0.25  0.27
Producer  Price  :  Mean  1953.48  1998.10  2003.33
Cz$/per  ton  s  C.V.  0.12  0.14  0.08
Consumer  Price  :  Mean  1679.52  1998.10  2003.33
Cz$/per  ton  :  C.V.  0.13  0.14  0.08
Production  :  Mean  17484.98  17618.74  17634.42
1000  Tons  :  C.V.  0.13  0.13  0.13
Consumption  :  Mean  19220.75  17618.74  17592.44
1000  Tons  :  C.V.  0.12  0.13  0.14- 15  -
Table  4
CORN PRODUCER  SURPLUS  (Million  Cr$,  Detrended)
Risk  Coefficient  s  Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Band  Rule
1.00
Risk  Premium  373.17  461.98  331.55
Z  of series  mean  s  1.33S  1.59?  1.142
1.33
Risk  Premium  494.62  602.85  435.26
2 of series  mean  s  1.76S  2.08?  1.49Z
1.67
Risk  Premium  614.68  737.28  535.76
2  of series  mean  *  2.19?  2.54?  1.842
2.00
Risk  Premium  733.43  865.38  633.21
2  of series  mean  s  2.61Z  2.98?  2.172- 16 -
The 'band  proposal'  consists  of upper  and lower  limits  of 12 percent  of
the  reference  price,  which  is  calculated  as a  60  month  moving  average  of (past)
wholesale  prices  in  Sao  Paulo. With  respect  to  the  actual  situation  the  results
indicate  that both consumer  and producer  prices  are  higher  and more stable.
Average  producer  revenue  and  producer  income  are  higher  with  the  price  band,  but
consumer  surplus  is  lower. Producer  revenue  is  more  stable  (the  coefficient  of
variation  is reduced  by roughly  13 percent)  and the  variability  of producer
income  is  only  msrginally  affected.  Nonetheless,  the  value  of  the  welfare  gains
are  very small:  0.28  and  0.17  percent  respectively  for  revenue  and  income.
One of the  most  attractive  features  of this  policy  is its  impact  on the
government  deficit.  The  actual  situation  is  one  in  which  average  consumer  prices
are  lower  than  average  producer  prices  and  consumption  is  higher  than  production.
It is  difficult  to estimate  the  implied  deficit  because  average  prices  include
the  margins  in the  final  market 10 (in  this  case  wholesale  margins). However,
if one assumes  that producer  prices  are equal to world  prices  the estimated
deficit  based on average  consumption  and prices  would be 6,123  millions  of
cruzados'l. With the  price  band,  production  is only 41,000  tons  higher  than
consumption;  with consumer,  producer  and free  trade  prices  virtually  the  same
the  costs  for  the  government  are  negligible.
Compared  to the free trade  situation,  a reduction  of 43 percent  in the
coefficient  of variation  of prices  is observed. Even though  the  coefficients
10  Data  were  not  available  to  correct  for  that.  Changes  in  average  values,
because  of this,  have  to be taken  cautiously.
11 This may be somewhat  overestimated  because of the assumption  that
producer  prices  are  equal  to  world  prices.  Braverman  et. al. (1990)  indicates
that for  reasonable  values  of the  coefficient  of nominal  protection  the  error
is relatively  small.- 17 -
of variations  of producers  revenue  and income  are reduced,  the final  welfare
value  of the  additional  stability  is  only  0.53  percent  of free  trade  income.
3.3  Rice
Production  of  rice  has  moved  from  the  states  of  the  Northeast  (principally
Maranhao)  to  the  Southeast  and  to  the  Central  West  of  Brazil. The  South  produces
mainly  in irrigated  land,  however,  about  70 percent  of rice  production  takes
place  in rainfed  areas  in  the  states  of the  central  western  part of  Brazil.
The Brazilian  government  has been  involved  in almost  all stages  of rice
marketing.  Concerns  with  price  fluctuations  in  the  major  urban  centers  have  been
the  driving  force  of the intervention.  As Table  5 indicates,  the  coefficient
of  variation  of  the  detrended  series  of  producer  prices  is  15  percent,  10  percent
for  production  and  7  percent  for  consumption. The  coefficient  of  variation  for
producer  surplus  and  producer  revenue  is around  15 percent. The risk  cost  to
producers  was 456  million  Cz$ (based  on producer  surplus),  i.e.  1.07  percent
of  mean income  over the  period  (Table  6).
Under  free  trade,  the  coefficient  of  variation  of prices  is far  greater
than the  observed  one.  The same  is true  for  revenue  and  income  of producers.
The risk  premium  associated  with the latter  now increases  to 7.23 of average
revenue,  as can  be seen in Table  6.  Comparing  the  historical  data  with the
simulated  free  trade  series,  the  monetary  value  of the increased  risk  cost  is
(1625.02-642.34=)  982.68  million  Cz$ per  annum.  The  corresponding  figure  for
producer  income  is (1110.64  - 456.12  =)  654.5. Producers  lose  out  on the  risk
front;  the  transfer  benefit  of going  to free  trade  is also  negative  (this  has- 18  -
Table  5
RICE  SINGLE  MARKET  SUMMARY  (1971-1986,  Detrended)
Series  /  TJnits  s Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Band  Rule
Producer  Revenue  s  Mean  52338.32  22477.03  20821.60
Million  Cz$  *  C.V.  0.16  0.37  0.10
Producer  Surplus  s  Mean  42584.64  19370.94  18530.43
Million  Cz$  s  C.V.  0.15  0.33  O.i;
Consumer  Surplus  s  Mean  74387.20  94489.79  95846.20
Million  Cz$  s  C.V.  0.13  0.15  0.12
Producer  Price  s  Mean  7392.17  3912.02  3614.18
Cz$/per  ton  s  C.V.  0.15  0.39  0.09
Consumer  Price  :  Mean  7469.90  3912.02  3614.18
Cz$/per  ton  X  C.V.  0.14  0.39  0.09
Production  s  Mean  7140.53  592S.94  5826.33
1000  Tons  :  C.V.  0.10  0.08  0.14
Consumption  s  Mean  5255.87  5929.94  5986.37
1000  Tons  :  C.V.  0.07  0.08  0.06- 19  -
Table  6
RICE  PRODUCER  SURPLUS  (Million  Cr$,  Detrended)
Risk  Coefficient  s Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Band  Rule
1.00
Risk  Premium  456.12  2.110.64  119.63
x  of series  mean  :  1.07X  5.732  0.65%
1.33
Risk  Premium  a  602.46  1498.31  160.13
% of series  mean  s  1.41X  7.73Z  0.86Z
1.67
Risk  Premium  745.70  1890.50  200.92
2  of series  mean  s  1.75Z  9.76Z  1.08Z
2.00
Risk  Premium  s  885.73  2284.14  241.99
2 of series  mean  I  2.08Z  11.79Z  1.312- 20 -
to  be  interpreted  with  care  because  of  margins,  but  this  fact  has  been  confirmed
by  other  studies,  Brandao  and  Carvalho  (forthcoming]).  The  major  gain  from  free
trade is, of course, that the inefficiency  costs of pricc distortions  are
avoided. In  the  case  of  rice,  the  allocative  gain  of  the  movement  to  free  trade,
computed,  as usual,  from the changes  in consumer  and producer  surpluses  and
changes  in  government  accounts,  is  of the  order  of  10,367  millions  of  cruzados.
The  band  proposal  consists  of  upper  and  lower  limits  of 12  percent  above
and  below  the  reference  price (computed  as a 60  month  average  of past prices)
for  price  variation  without  any  intervention  from  the  government.  Producer  and
consumer  prices  will  be  more  stable  compared  with the  two  other  scenarios.  The
average  price  with  the  band  is  not  that  different  from  the  free  trade  outcome  -
- the  real  difference  is  in  the  variability.  The  band  rule  will  also  stabilize
producer  revenue  and  producer  income.  With  a  risk  aversion  coefficient  of 1  the
risk  gain  from  the  free  trade  base  is  equal  to (1625.02-102.02-)  1522.99  million
Cz$  in  terms  of revenue  (for  producer  surplus  the  corresponding  figure  is  991.09
million  Cz$).  The  efficiency  loss  on average  in  going  from  free  trade  to  band
rule  is  227  million  Cz$.
Comparing  the  actual  situation  with  the  band  rule  the  risk  gain  is  540.31
million  Cz$ for  producer  income  and  336.49  million  for  producer  surplus. This
compares  with an average  efficiercy  gain  of  around  11,624  million  Cz$.
3.4  Cotton
Cotton  is produced  mainly  in the  Center-South  of Brazil. Ceara is the
only important  producer  in the  Northeast. It is exported,  but the  volume  is- 21 -
cleclining  over time.  It is, of course,  an important  input  to the textile
industry,  which  has  great  influence  on the  formulation  of cotton  policies.
Instability  of domestic  supply  and demand,  of the world price  and of
government  policy  induces  the  instability  observed  in  prices  received  by  farmers
and prices  paid by consumers  as well on producer  revenue  and income  and on
consumer surplus.  Table 7 summarizes  the main results  of  the analysis.
Instability  of producer  prices during 1979-1986  is not very large.  The
coefficient  of  variation  of  producer  price  is  lower  than  that  for  consumer  price.
This indicates  that  for  cotton  too  current  policies  have been  more successful
in the  stabilization  of producer  prices.
Table  8  shows  the  risk  analysis  for  producers  income. The  estimated  value
of  the  risk  premium,  for  a  coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  of one,  is  2.26
percent  of average  producer  income.
In the free trade scenario,  there  is more instability  of consumer  and
producer  prices. The  risk  premium  on income  is  5.86  percent  of average  income.
Comparing  the  revenue  and income  streams  in the  two  policy  regimes  it is seen
that  the  risk  benefit  implicit  in  the  stabilization  provided  by  current  policies
is  3.04  percent  of  mean  revenue  under  free  trade  and  it  2.81  percent  for  producer
income.
The band proposal  for cotton  considered  upper and lower limits  of 25
percent above and below a  36 month moving average (adopted  because data
availability) 12. Under  this  policy  regime,  the  average  price  received  by
12 When the  band  proposal  was first  implemented,  complete  free  trade  was
adopted  for  this  commodity.  However,  because  earlier  proposals  included  cotton
in the band policy,  we estimated  the  effects  of one plausible  version  of the
policy.- 22 -
Table 7
COTTON SINGLE MARKET SUMMARY (1979-1986,  Detrended)
Series  /  Units  X  Historical Data  Free Trade  Band Rule
Producer Revenue  :  Mean  12135.73  10298.06  10822.57
Million Cz$  :  C.V.  0.11  0.27  0.20
Producer Surplus  :  Mean  6285.85  5257.39  5570.61
Million Cz$  :  C.V.  0.20  0.34  0.25
Consumer Surplus  :  Mean  2467.79  4140.54  3681.67
Million Cz$  :  C.V.  0.14  0.30  0.26
Producer Price  :  Mean  18231.77  16683.13  17181.10
Cz$/per ton  C.V.  0.11  0.18  0.15
Consumer Price  Mean  18894.61  16683.13  17181.10
Cz$/per ton  C.V.  0.13  0.18  0.15
Production  Mean  676.13  621.14  638.83
1000 Tons  :  C.V.  0.13  0.18  0.15
Consumption  Mean  616.87  789.91  750.95
1000 Tons  :  C.V.  0.07  0.16  0.14- 23 -
Table  8
COTTON  PRODUCER  SURPLUS  (Million  Cr$,  Detrended)
Risk  Coefficient  :  Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Band  Rule
1.00
Risk  Premium  s  142.31  308.10  179.00
Z of series  mean  s  2.26Z  5.862  3.212
1.33
Risk  Premium  s  192.94  412.86  239.15
2  of series  mean  s  3.072  7.85Z  4.292
1.67
Risk  Premium  245.26  517.67  299.22
2  of series  mean  I  3.90Z  9.852  5.37Z
2.00
Risk  Premium  s  299.26  621.83  359.01
2  of series  mean  s  4.762  11.832  6.442- 24 -
producers  is  higher  than  the  free  trade  price. The  instability  associated  with
producer  prices  is  higher  when  compared  with the  observed  situation.
If the  policy  is  viewed  as an  alternative  to  free  trade,  the  situation  is
slightly  different:  both prices  and producers'  income  are  more stable.  The
change  in  mean  income  is  +5.96  percent  and  the  efficiency  gain  due  to  more  stable
income  is  4.34  percent.
The band policy will benefit producers compared  to the free trade
situation,  and, of course,  the government  will collect  some revenue  from the
tariff  it imposes  (roughly  estimated  as 54 millions  of cruzados)1 3 . In the
observed  situation,  the  government  runs  an  even  larger  surplus  (roughly  estimated
as  240  millions  of  cruzados)  because  the  tax  on  consumers  more  than  compensates
the subsidy  to cotton  producers  (both  the subsidy  to consumers  and  the tax  on
producers  estimated  from  a comparison  between  domestic  and  world  prices).
Distortions  of the  exchange  rate  were  not  taken  into  account. This  does
not  affect  the  results  of  the  risk  analysis  because  the  coefficient  of  variation
of  the  official  exchange  rate  and  that  of  an  equilibrium  exchange  rate  estimated
by Brandao  and  Carvalho,  op.  cit.  are  quite  similar. Nonetheless,  it should
be  noted,  when it  comes  to  average  impacts,  the  use  of  the  equilibrium  exchange
rate  can  make a  big  difference  (see  Brandlo  and  Carvalho,  op.  cit.).
13  We remind  the  reader  that  average  values  are  to  be interpreted  carefully
since  they  are  very  sensitive  to  the  way  margins  were  calculated.  In  particular,
even  though  our results  indicate  that  Brazil,  under  both  the  free  trade  regime
and  the  band rule  regime,  will  become  a  net  importer  of  cotton,  we do  not  think
that the methodology  and the procedures  utilized  in this study  permit  that
inference.  The calculations  referring  to averages  are mostly illustrative,
specially  in  the  case  of  cotton  for  which  there  exists  evidence  of  high  taxation
of producers  (Brandao  and Carvalho  [forthcoming];  note also that the period
analyzed  in  that  study  is  not  the  same  as in  this  one).- 25 -
3.5  Wheat
Government  intervention  in the  wheat  market  is strong. The government
sets producer  and consumer  prices  for wheat sold to mills, flour  and bread
prices. Marketing  of  wheat  grain  is entiiely  in the  hands  of the  government,
which purchases  from domestic  producers,  imports  and sells  grain  to millers.
Brazil  has been a traditional  importer  of  wheat  and  this situation  would  have
prevailed  even under  free tradel 4. In the actual  situation,  since  consumer
prices  are  held  below  world  prices,  the  tendency  is  fo:  imports  to  be larger  and
this  tendency  is  not  outweighed  by  producer  prices  being  above  th2ir  world  price
levels. The  gap  between  producer  and  consumer  prices  and  the  world  price  means
a significant  fiscal  deficit.
Domestic prices different from world  prices generate well  known
inefficiencies. Liberalization,  on the other  hand,  would mean that domestic
prices  will be subject  to the vagaries  of international  markets,  a state  of
affairs that it was  the  intention (at least partially) of  the  initial
interventions  to mitigate. If intervention  prices  are  more stable  than  world
prices,  there is a clear trade-off  between  the stabilization  gains  from the
intervention  and  the  deadweight  losses  t.hereof.  The  band  rule  proposal  can  be
seen  as  a  solution  to  the  problem  that  lies  between  the  two  extremes  of  complete
liberalization  and  complete  stabilization.
Table  9 summarizes  the  picture  for  the  period  1977-1985. It  can  be seen
that  on average  the  producer  price  was kept  22.5  above  the  world  price  and  the
14 The 1980s  witnessed  a substantial  increase  in  wheat  yields  in  Brazil.
Self-sufficient  in the  future  is  possible.- 26 -
consumer price was kept 49.0 percent below the  world price.  However, what is
Table 9
WHEAT SINGLE  MARKET SUMMARY (1977-1985,  Detrended)
Series /  Units  :  Historical Data  Free Trade  Band Rule
Value of Imports  :  Mean  11175.71  5475.36  4741.89
Million Cz$  :  C.V.  0.19  0.41  0.35
Fiscal Deficit  :  Mean  9728.07  0.00  -108.79
Million Cz$  :  C.V.  0.35  0.00  -2.12
Producer Revenue  :  Mean  7090.65  5265.29  5645.11
Million Cz$  :  C.V.  0.39  0.37  0.31
Producer Surplus  :  Mean  5243.30  4041.33  4278.42
Million Cz$  :  C.V.  0.46  0.43  0.39
Consumer Surplus  s  Mean  11828.34  5195.78  4725.67
Million Cz$  sC.V.  0.21  0.37  0.33
Producer Price  :  Mean  3111.22  2540.53  2693.74
Cz$Iper ton  :  C.V.  0.14  0.11  0.07
Consumer Price  :  Mean  1295.14  2540.53  2693.74
Cz$/per ton  :  C.V.  0.22  0.11  0.07
Production  :  Mean  2239.61  2026.06  2083.39
1000 Tons  :  C.V.  0.27  0.30  0.29
Consumption  :  Mean  6593.46  4259.17  3972.00
1000 Tons  :  C.V.  0.11  0.18  0.14- 27  -
striking  is that the free trade  price  has been less  volatile  than either  the
producer  price  or  the  consumer  price  domestically.  The  risk  cost  associated  with
producer  surplus,  as shown  in  Table  10,  has  a  monetary  value  of 487  million  Cz$
or 9.32  percent  of average  surplus. To sustain  the  policy  it  was  necessary  to
incur  in  a large  deficits  and  a large  import  bill.
With  free  trade,  of  course,  there  is  no fiscal  deficit  and  the  import  bill
is smaller.  The allocative  gain has a monetary  value of 1,875  million  Cz$
average  per  year  and  there  would  be  no reduction  in  the  variability  of  producers'
revenue  or income. Note,  however,  that  consumption  is  more unstable  with free
trade.
The  gain  in  stability  of income  for  producers  is  only  113.77  million  Cz$,
which is  small  relative  to the  mean loss  suffered  by producers.
Even though  there  have not been  any formal  band proposal  for  wheat,  we
simulated  the  results  of imposing  upper  and  lower  limits  of  12  percent  above  and
below  a  reference  price  (calculated  as  a  60  month  moving  average  of  past  prices).
The policy actually  reduces  the coefficient  of variation  of consumers  and
producer  prices  compared  with  the  historical  situation  and  with  free  trade. The
average  consumer  price  increases  when  compared  to  free  trade,  but  it  is  less  than
the  average  price  in the  current  situation.  Producer  price  is  higher  than  free
trade  price  but  lower  than  the  observed  historically.  Consumer  surplus,  producer
surplus  and  producer  revenue  are stabilized. The  monetary  value of the  risk
benefit  to producers  is 52.00  million  Cz$ which has to be compared  to the
efficiency  cost  of 125  million  Cz$  of the  policy.- 28 -
Table  10
WHEAT  PRODUCER  SURPLUS  (Million  Cr$,  Detrended)
Risk  Coefficient  s  Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Band  Rule
1.00
Risk  Premium  488.60  374.83  322.83
2  of series  mean  9.32Z  9.272  7.552
1.33
Risk  Premium  638.03  494.37  430.05
2 of series  mean  :  12.17Z  12.23Z  10.05Z
1.67
'sk  Premium  779.49  608.95  535.63
. of series  mean  :  14.87Z  15.072  12.522
2.00
Risk  Premium  912.56  717.65  638.79
2  of series  mean  :  17.402  17.76?  14.932- 29 -
4.  The  Soybean  Complex
The  soybean  complex  consists  of three  interrelated  commodities:  soybeans,
soy oil and soy meal.  Their relation stems from the fact that soy oil and soy
meal are joint products  and that,  partly  due to policy  measures  in Brazil,
industrial  crushing  demand  is the  most important  component  of soybeans  demand
(the  other  component  being  exports). The  model  of this  complex  is,  naturally,
a  multi-market  model,  albeit  a simple  one. The  structure  used  in  this  paper  is
adapted  from  that  utilized  by Braverman,  Hammer  and  BrandAo  (1987)  and  earlier
by Williams  and  Thompson  (1982). It is assumed  that  by setting  export  quotas
to the  three  products  of the  complex  the  government  seeks  to  maintain  capacity
utilization  in  the  crushing  industry.  Even  though  this  has  not  being  the  unique
instrument  of  intervention  its  utilization  was  overwhelming  and,  for  the  purposes
of the  model,  it  captures  the  essence  of government  intervention.
The  equations  of the  soy  complex  are  the  following:
5s,t  = as,t  +  Psps,t  (2)
DS,t  = CS,t  +  Xs,t  (3)
Ss,t =  Ss,t  (4)
WsoxCs,t . DsO,t + XsO,t  (5)
WsmxCst  = Dsm,t + xsm,t  (6)
DSO,t =  aSO,t - bsO,txpSO,t  (7)
Dsm,t  3  asm,t - bsm,txPsm,t  (8)
ps,t  W  WsO.PsO,t + Wsmxpsm,t  + dt  (9)
CS,t  e  aS,t  - bS.dt  (10)
Equations  (2),  (3)  and (4)  specify  the  supply  function  for  soybeans,  the
demand  for  soybeans  as  a sum  of crushing  demand  (Cs,t)  and  export  demand  (Xs,t)- 30 -
and  the  equilibrium  condition  of supply  equals  demand,  respectively.  Equation
(5)  introduces  W50, the proportion  whereby  crushed  soybeans  are converted  to
soy  oil. The left  hand side  of (5)  is  thus  the  supply  of soy  oil. The  right
hand side is domestic  plus export  demand  for this  commodity. Similarly,  (6)
specifies  equality  of  the  supply  of soy  meal  and  domestic  and  foreign  demand  for
it.  Equations  (7)  and (8)  are domestic  demand  functions  for soy  oil and soy
meal.  Equation  (9)  defines  the  crushing  margin,  dt --  the  difference  between
revenue  from  sales  of the  product  of one unit of soybeans  and its  cost.  The
profitability  of crushing  will determine  the  demand  for  soybeans;  equation  (10)
captures  this  in terms  of a linear  demand  curve  relationship  between  CS,t and
dt.
Notice  that all slopes  in equations  (2)-(10)  do not have the index  t,
while the intercepts  do.  This is in keeping  with the assumption  that shocks
displace  supply  and  demand  purely  through  vertical  shifts.
With the model set up as above,  we can proceed to the analysis  of
instability. The methodology  is the same as before:  fJrst  we examine  the
historical  situation,  then free trade is simulated  and finally  a band rule
proposal  is  examined. The  original  proposal  contemplated  a band  of 25  percent
above  and  below  the  long  run  prices  (here  defined,  because  the  price  series  is
short, as a  36 month average of past prices).  This is utilized in the
simulations  below 15 together  with the  data  required  by the  model.
Tables  11,  12  and  13 summarize  the  results  for  soybeans,  soy  oil  and  soy
meal respectively.  Notice  that  over  this  period  average  free  trade  prices  for
15  Up to this  date,  no band rule  has  been applied  to soybeans.  Since  the
implementation  of the  band rule for  edible  beans,  rice and  corn,  the soybean
complex  was  mostly  under  free  trade.- 31  -
Table  11
SOYBEANS  MULTI  MARKET  SUMMARY  (1980-1985,  Detrended)
Series  /  Units  Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Band  Rule
Value  of  Exports  zMean  12.13  -57.51  -59.26
Million Cz$  :  C.V.  1.19  -0.72  -0.71
Fiscal  Deficit  :  Mean  0.15  0.00  -0.15
Million  Cz$  :C.V.  2.25  - -2  .22
Producer  Revenue  :  Mean  361.66  360.78  361.79
Million  Cz$  :  C.V.  0.15  0.18  0.18
Producer  Surplus  Mean  178.76  178.96  179.48
Million  Cz$  :  C.V  0.16  0.22  0.22
Consumer  Surplus  Mean  416.12  597.90  603.28
Million  Cz$  :  C.V.  0.09  0.05  0.06
Producer  Price  :Mean  25.65  25.63  25.67
Cz$/per  ton  :C.V.  0.14  0.13  0.13
Consumer  Price  :Mean  25.65  25.63  25.67
Cz$/per  ton  C.V.  0.14  0.13  0.13
Production  :Mean  14055.29  14042.07  14066.44
1000  Tons  C.V.  0.09  0.12  0.12
Consumption  Mean  13586.67  16295.93  16363.18
1000  Tons  :C.V.  0.05  0.03  0.03- 32 -
Table 12
SOYBEANS PRODUCER REVENUE (Million  Cz$, Detrended)
Risk Coefficient  s  Historical Data  Free Trade  Band Rule
1.00
Risk Premium  4.76  6.93  6.41
2  of series  mean  *  1.32Z  1.92Z  1.77Z
1.33
Risk Premium  6.47  9.48  8.76
Z of series mean  :  1.79Z  2.63Z  2.42Z
1.67
Risk Premium  :  8.24  12.15  11.21
2 of series mean  :  2.282  3.372  3.102
2.00
Risk Premium  10.06  14.94  13.75
2 of series  mean  :  2.78?  4.142  3.80Z- 33 -
Table  13
SOY  OIL  MULTI  MARKET  SUMMARY  (1980-1985,  Detrended)
Series  /  Units  :  Historical  Data  Free  Trade  Band  Rule
Value  of  Exports  s  Mean  68.24  71.05  71.81
Million  Cz$  s  C.V.  0.23  0.25  0.27
Fiscal  Deficit  s  Mean  50.92  0.00  -2.12
Million  Cz$  s  C.V.  0.27  - -3.95
Consumer  Surplus  s  Mean  488.32  557.05  559.74
Million  Cz$  a  C.V.  0.35  0.31  0.30
Producer  Price  s  Mean  97.01  55.64  54.27
Cz$/per  ton  :  C.V.  0.11  0.18  0.13
Consumer  Price  :  Mean  97.01  55.64  54.27
Cz$Iper  ton  :  C.V.  0.11  0.18  0.13
Production  :  Mean  2862.83  3063.63  3076.28
1000  Tons  :  C.V.  0.09  0.03  0.03
Consumption  t  Mean  1643.32  1762.10  1766.05
1000  Tons  a  C.V.  0.17  0.15  0.15- 34 -
soybeans  are  slightly  below  domestic  prices,  which  indicates  that  producers  have
been  protectedl 6. The  net  effect  of free  trade  is  to reduce  slightly  soybeans
production  and increase  consumption.  This  comes  about  because  domestic  demand
depends  on the  crushing  margin  which,  as the results  indicate,  increase  (even
though  soy  oil  and  soy  meal  prices  are  reduced  by free  trade,  soybeans  price  is
also  reduced,  so  that  the  net  effect  was an increase  in  the  crushing  margin)  in
response  to free trade  7. The coefficient  of variation  of soybean  prices  is
slightly  reduced  with free  trade. Both,  producer  revenue  and  producer  surplus
become  more  unstable  under  free  trade;  the  cost  of the  additional  risk,  as  can
be seen  in Table  14,  is  2.z2  million  Cz$  per  year.  This  has to  be set  against
more stable  consumption  and  consumer  surplus  and  against  a lower  deficit. The
efficiency  cost in the soybeans  market  alone  is 182  million  Cz$.  Free trade
increases  the  instability  of soy  oil  prices  and  reduces  the  instability  of soy
meal  prices. Consumer  surplus  of  both  goods  increase  as a  result  of  free  trade.
Turning  now to the  band  rule,  we notice  that  it has  virtually  no effect
on price instability,  producer  revenue,  producer  surplus,  etc..  A detailed
analysis  shows  that  the  band  will  be  hit  only  once  over  the  six  year  period  1980-
1985.  This  would  be in 1982,  where  the  lower  limit  would  be hit --  this  also
explains  why the  mean  price  with  a  band  rule  is  higher  than  the  mean  price  with
free  trade. The  same  conclusion  on  instability  is  seen  for  soy  oil  and  soy  meal,
there  are  virtually  no stability  effects  of such  a  wide band  rule.
16 This only takes  into account  the so-called  direct  effects  of soybean
policies.  It ignores,  for  example,  the  overvaluation  of the  currency  which  has
been an important  implicit  tax on export  commodities  in Brazil  (Brandao  and
Carvalho,  op.cit.).
17  As  mentioned  earlier,  we would  like  to  deemphasize  the  implications  for
trade  flows,  even  though  the  results  above  seem  plausible.- 35 -
Table 14
SOY MEAL MULTI MARKET SUMMARY (1980-1985,  Detrended)
Series I  Units  :  Historical Data  Free Trade  Band Rule
Value of Exports  :  Mean  188.35  190.76  191.95
Million Cz$  : C.V.  0.15  0.15  0.15
Fiscal Deficit  :Mean  54.95  0.00  0.00
Million Cz$  :C.V.  0.48  0.00  0.00
Consumer Surplus  :Mean  27.23  42.48  42.48
Million Cz$  :C.V.  0.67  0.33  0.33
Producer Price  :Mean  26.37  20.62  20.62
Cz$/per ton  :C.V.  0.16  0.13  0.13
Consumer Price  :Mean  26.37  20.62  20.62
Cz$/per ton  :C.V.  0.16  0.13  0.13
Production  :Mean  11725.43  12547.86  12599.65
1000 Tons  :C.V.  0.09  0.03  0.03
Consumption  :Mean  2518.00  3272.38  3272.38
1000 Tons  : C.V.  0.36  0.18  0.18- 36 -
5. Summary  and  Conclusions
There  are  two  general  propositions  that  come  from  the  analysis  presented
in  this  paper.  First  is that  the implications  of adopting  a band rule  policy
are  highly  dependent  on  specific  characteristics  of  the  commodities.  The  results
presented  before  indicate  that:
a) for edible  beans the policies  adopted  by the government  benefited
producers. Risks  associated  with this  crop  are  large,  and  the  efficiency  cost
of the  interventions  were smaller  than  the  benefits  to  farmers  of reduced  risk.
Furthermore,  the  band  rule  will  not  stabilize  producers  income  and  will  require
an  unreasonably  high (compared  to  historical)  level  of stocks;
b) for corn, the risk  benefits  to producers  tend to be low.  The band
policy  will  reduce  government  deficit,  and  so  it  is  an improvemenL  when  compared
with the actual  situation. However,  when compared  to free trade,  the band
proposal  does  not  affect  very  much  variability  of  key  variables,  indicating  that
perhaps  the  best  alternative  for  the  government  is to adopt  free  trade;
c)  for  rice f  e  trade will hurt producers both because it will
destabilize  income  and reduce  its  mean.  Nonetheless,  the  efficiency  cost  of
current  policies (which  protect  producers)  is large.  The band rule reduces
significantly  the cost of risk to producers  and its efficiency  costs are
relatively  small;
d) for  wheat  the  current  situation  is riskier  than free  trade  and large
deficits  are incurred  to support  producer  prices  and to subsidize  consumers.
The inefficiencies  caused  by the  band rule  proposal  are  larger  than  the  value
attributable  to the  reduction  of risk;- 37 -
e)  for soybeans, the risk cost of free trade is smaller than the
efficiency  gain in the  beans  market.  The  25 percent  band rule  has no effect
upon instability  compared  to the  free  trade  situation;
f) the results  for  cotton  indicate  that free trade  will increase  risk.
Even though no calculations  of the inefficiencies  associated  with current
policies  have been  made (because  of the strong  implications  for  trade  flows),
other  studies  (Brandao  and  Carvalho,  op.  cit.)  indicate  that  they  are  large.
The second  general  conclusion  that  comes  out  of this study  is that the
risk  reduction  welfare  gains  from  price  stabilization  are  unlikely  to  be large,
in general,  relative  to the  welfare  gains from  price reform,  and that,  in a
number of cases, the transfer  (dis)  benefit  outweighs  the risk benefi  .o
producers.
Even  though  multi-market  models  (apart  from  the  simplified  soybean  complex
model)  have  not  been  discussed  here,  we concluded,  based  on the  results  of our
study (Braverman,  et.  al., 1990), that they do not have quantitatively
significant  effects  on the single  market  results,  so far as stabilization  is
concerned. However,  as is to be expected  from  the  earlier  work of Braverman,
Hammer  and Associates,  multi-market  interactions  do affect  average  outcomes
significantly.
To conclude  the  paper,  we  would  like  to emphasize  the  need  for  additional
research  into the  macroeconomic  implications  of price  stabilization  policies.
From the point  of view of policy  makers,  those  are rather  important  issues,
specially  in countries  facing  unstable  but  moderate  rates  of inflation  and in
which  agricultural  expenditures  constitute  a large  proportion  of  the  government
budget.- 38 -
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Edible Beans  0.36  0.50
Corn  0.36  0.50
Rice  0.37  0.28
Cotton  1.10  2.80
Wheat  0.55  0.47
Soybeans  1.18  0.24
Soy oil  - 0.20
Soy meal  1.50
Source:  Elasticities obtained from  various studies. For details see  Braverman
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